I
want to eventually create a driver-by-driver preview of the 2015
IndyCar season. I believe the preview will be more interesting (and may
be more accurate) if done by comparing a driver’s predicted season
performance to the performances of past IndyCar champions. IndyCar
awards championship points after each race based on a drivers’ finishing
position. At the end of the season, the driver with the most points is
the champion. In theory, analyzing past champions will provide a numerical ‘goal’ that a
driver must reach to be champion - drivers without a chance of reaching
this target are unlikely to win the championship. There will still be a
lot of subjectivity, but I plan to focus on numbers more heavily than a
traditional season preview.
I used 2 models to predict how many points the 2015 IndyCar champion will score. The first considered how many points the champion will earn, on average, from each race. The second model combined similar finishing positions into groups (for example, 2nd and 3rd, or 6th through 8th) and considered how many times the champion would place in a finishing group. I explain each method in detail in separate posts, but the key takeaway is that the models predict the 2015 IndyCar champion will score between 546 and 567 points, excluding Indianapolis 500 qualifying. It's also likely that the 2015 champion will win 4 races. That's an average of over 30 points per race, which is slightly better than a third place finish in each race.
Very few drivers have a realistic chance to win 4 races and average a third place finish in every race. Don't get me wrong, there will be plenty of talent in the 2015 IndyCar field. Based on Marshall Pruett's silly season report on racer.com, nearly 75% (14 of 20) drivers who are confirmed to full time rides (and Ed Carpenter) have IndyCar wins on their resumes, but I'd say no more than 5 drivers have a good chance at the title, the sponsor recognition, and 'glory' that champions receive.
Fortunately for non-championship contenders, there is another way to achieve success in IndyCar: win individual races. Winners receive similar levels of sponsor recognition after the race that a champion does, and the team still gets a significant amount of 'glory'. Teams also have more chances to win races than championships: each year's one championship is composed of between 15 and 20 races.
While wins are very valuable to non-championship contenders, good finishes that aren't wins are not especially valuable. Consider these 2 seasons:
1. A season with 1 win, 3 podium finishes of 2nd or 3rd, and a 5th place finish in points
2. A season with 2 wins, 1 podium finish of 2nd or 3rd, and a 9th place finish in points
A team, sponsors, and the driver would prefer the second season to the first. The team and sponsors get more exposure from the wins than a top 5 championship finish. A driver at a mid pack team who is looking for a better ride would rather have more wins on his/her resume. It's easier to convince an aggressive driver to 'tone it down' than it is to teach a slow driver how to drive faster.
Given the high value of wins relative to other finishes, non-championship contenders should be more aggressive than they typically are. This aggression should start before the race weekend: non-championship contenders should swing for the fences with the setups they take to the track. Track time is limited at most race weekends, and a team with a good initial setup has an advantage that can be difficult for others to overcome.
Teams should also be more aggressive with the strategy choices they make during races. At road courses, a team that qualifies outside the top 10 probably has little chance of a win if they use a 'normal' strategy. With so little to lose, these teams should frequently roll the dice and use a different pit strategy than the leaders. On an oval, slower teams should run a leaner fuel mixture and pit later than the leaders. If a yellow comes out after the leaders have pitted but before the slower car pits, the slower car may trap the leaders a lap down and gain the lead. If any of these gambles don't work out, the team hasn't lost much - few people remember who had a bad finish anyways, especially if the car turned fast lap times but lost positions because of a strategy gamble.
These David strategies are seen in other sports: underdog basketball teams often decide to shoot an unusually high amount of three pointers, a hockey team that's losing will pull its goalie in the final minute of a game, and the Oakland A's focused on OBP and slugging percentage in the early 2000's.
Teams can combat this lack of aggressiveness in several ways. First, they must make a realistic analysis of their chances to win the championship before the season begins. A team that's honest with itself and recognizes that a championship is unlikely will have more chances to win races by being aggressive, especially early in the season when other teams might be more concerned about keeping non-existant championship hopes alive.
Teams should also share this analysis with sponsors. Although sponsors don't want to see their cars have bad results, knowing that some bad days will come along with the chances for more wins (and increased exposure from being off sequence with the leaders) will more than offset the exposure the team would have received from many good but not great finishes.
Lastly, team owners, executives, and managers need to evaluate crew chiefs and strategists by the thought process that went into their decisions, not just the results of those decisions. Loss aversion probably impacts IndyCar crews as much as the normal population, and may prevent aggressiveness that would be beneficial to the team in the long run.
In closing, very few drivers should race for points in 2015. A true championship contender must drive for a well funded team (Andretti, Ganassi, or Penske), and have ample experience winning races on both ovals and road courses. The fact of the matter is that few drivers fit this profile. These drivers and their teams would be much better off to aggressively pursue wins in 2015.
If you want to get in touch, feel free to leave a comment or send an email to spottersstand@gmail.com. Follow the blog on Twitter (@spotstandblog) for reminders about new posts.
Very few drivers have a realistic chance to win 4 races and average a third place finish in every race. Don't get me wrong, there will be plenty of talent in the 2015 IndyCar field. Based on Marshall Pruett's silly season report on racer.com, nearly 75% (14 of 20) drivers who are confirmed to full time rides (and Ed Carpenter) have IndyCar wins on their resumes, but I'd say no more than 5 drivers have a good chance at the title, the sponsor recognition, and 'glory' that champions receive.
Fortunately for non-championship contenders, there is another way to achieve success in IndyCar: win individual races. Winners receive similar levels of sponsor recognition after the race that a champion does, and the team still gets a significant amount of 'glory'. Teams also have more chances to win races than championships: each year's one championship is composed of between 15 and 20 races.
While wins are very valuable to non-championship contenders, good finishes that aren't wins are not especially valuable. Consider these 2 seasons:
1. A season with 1 win, 3 podium finishes of 2nd or 3rd, and a 5th place finish in points
2. A season with 2 wins, 1 podium finish of 2nd or 3rd, and a 9th place finish in points
A team, sponsors, and the driver would prefer the second season to the first. The team and sponsors get more exposure from the wins than a top 5 championship finish. A driver at a mid pack team who is looking for a better ride would rather have more wins on his/her resume. It's easier to convince an aggressive driver to 'tone it down' than it is to teach a slow driver how to drive faster.
Given the high value of wins relative to other finishes, non-championship contenders should be more aggressive than they typically are. This aggression should start before the race weekend: non-championship contenders should swing for the fences with the setups they take to the track. Track time is limited at most race weekends, and a team with a good initial setup has an advantage that can be difficult for others to overcome.
Teams should also be more aggressive with the strategy choices they make during races. At road courses, a team that qualifies outside the top 10 probably has little chance of a win if they use a 'normal' strategy. With so little to lose, these teams should frequently roll the dice and use a different pit strategy than the leaders. On an oval, slower teams should run a leaner fuel mixture and pit later than the leaders. If a yellow comes out after the leaders have pitted but before the slower car pits, the slower car may trap the leaders a lap down and gain the lead. If any of these gambles don't work out, the team hasn't lost much - few people remember who had a bad finish anyways, especially if the car turned fast lap times but lost positions because of a strategy gamble.
These David strategies are seen in other sports: underdog basketball teams often decide to shoot an unusually high amount of three pointers, a hockey team that's losing will pull its goalie in the final minute of a game, and the Oakland A's focused on OBP and slugging percentage in the early 2000's.
Teams can combat this lack of aggressiveness in several ways. First, they must make a realistic analysis of their chances to win the championship before the season begins. A team that's honest with itself and recognizes that a championship is unlikely will have more chances to win races by being aggressive, especially early in the season when other teams might be more concerned about keeping non-existant championship hopes alive.
Teams should also share this analysis with sponsors. Although sponsors don't want to see their cars have bad results, knowing that some bad days will come along with the chances for more wins (and increased exposure from being off sequence with the leaders) will more than offset the exposure the team would have received from many good but not great finishes.
Lastly, team owners, executives, and managers need to evaluate crew chiefs and strategists by the thought process that went into their decisions, not just the results of those decisions. Loss aversion probably impacts IndyCar crews as much as the normal population, and may prevent aggressiveness that would be beneficial to the team in the long run.
In closing, very few drivers should race for points in 2015. A true championship contender must drive for a well funded team (Andretti, Ganassi, or Penske), and have ample experience winning races on both ovals and road courses. The fact of the matter is that few drivers fit this profile. These drivers and their teams would be much better off to aggressively pursue wins in 2015.
If you want to get in touch, feel free to leave a comment or send an email to spottersstand@gmail.com. Follow the blog on Twitter (@spotstandblog) for reminders about new posts.
